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Abstract
This paper reports on results obtained from the estimation of a rail cost
function using a pooled-time series, cross section of Class I railroads for the
period 1974-1986. An analysis is performed of short-run and long-run returns to
scale, the extent of capital disequilibrium, and adjustments to way and struc-
tures capital in the heavily regulated and quasi-regulated environments before
and after the passage of the Staggers Act in 1980. In general, it is found that
there is considerable overcapitalization in the rail industry and that this has
persisted in spite of the regulatory freedom provided by the Staggers Act.
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RAIL COSTS AND CAPITAL ADJUSTMENTS
IN A QUASI REGULATED ENVIRONMENT
1. Introduction and Overview
With the passage of the Staggers Act in 1980, the US railroads obtained
substantial regulatory freedom to adjust their rates and their capital structure
through changes in their routes and service levels. Although most of the atten-
tion on the effects of rail deregulation has been focused upon the issue of rail
rates in a quasi-regulated environment,1 it is important to note that the
Staggers Act provided the railroads with considerable potential to rationalize
their capital structure by permitting them to abandon unprofitable traffic and
branch lines and by establishing as a legislative goal that the railroads earn
a fair rate of return to capital. The first provision was important since it
gave railroads the freedom to rationalize their rate structure; the second pro-
vision was important since it provided the marketplace with a signal that there
was a legislative intent for the railroads to become "profitable," or at least
earn a normal return to their capital. 2
The issue of adjustments in rail capital is significant because of the
considerable amount of evidence that prior to the passage of the Staggers Act,
railroads were in a position of substantial capital disequilibrium. On one hand
the common carrier obligation incurred by railroads forced them to sustain
excessive route networks; on the other hand railroads suffered from undercapi-
talization caused by low profitability and a consequent inability to generate
adequate internal or external funds to maintain their way and structures capital.
Given this capital disequilibrium and the evidence of significant scale economies
and/or returns to density, 3 it is unlikely that the observed economies of scale
2at a regulated equilibrium with a non-optimal capital stock are representative
of the costs and scale economies that would occur at a deregulated equilibrium
with optimal capital adjustments.4
This paper addresses these issues by reporting results from the estima-
tion of a short-run variable cost function using a pooled cross-section/time
series of a sample of Class I railroads for the period 1974-1986. This not only
presents an updated railroad cost function, 5 but it also provides sufficient
information to determine the extent capital disequilibrium during a regulated and
a quasi-regulated regime.
This paper takes the following form. The next section discusses the
specification of the cost function, a number of econometric issues related to its
specification, and the data set used in the estimation. Section3 presents evi-
dence on the degree of scale economies in the short and the long run, the effi-
ciency of the utilization of the capital stock, and the movement toward a capital
equilibrium during the sample period. Section 4 discusses the policy implica-
tions of these findings and provides a brief summary and conclusion.
2. Econometric Issues and the Estimation of Rail Costs
Since the capital embodied in the railroads' way and structures is long-
lived and difficult to adjust, railroad costs are estimated using a short-run
variable cost function of the following general form:
Cv = CV(y, w, t, XF, F, T) (1)
where y represents output, w is a vector of input prices, t is a vector of fac-
tors that affect the technological environment in which the firms operate, xF is
the fixed way and structures capital (ws), F is a vector of indicator variables
to reflect firm-specific effects, and T represents a vector of time counters to
3capture the effect of productivity growth, mergers, and deregulation. The data
in this analysis come primarily from various sources published by the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) or the Association of American Railroads (AAR). The
interested reader is directed to Vellturo (1989), who presents a full discussion
of the data sources and construction of the variables used in this analysis.
2.1 Variables. Variable cost (Cv) is primarily derived from conventional
"operating costs" as defined in standard railroad accounting. Way and
structures' maintenance costs are removed from operating costs and treated as in-
vestment. In addition, equipment depreciation is removed from operating costs and
is replaced by a "user cost" of equipment. The resulting variable cost measure,
therefore, has four components: fuel, labor, equipment, and materials and
supplies. 6 Note that to abstract from the effects of inflation, all variables
are measured in real (1974) dollars.
Since rail traffic is very heterogeneous, one would ideally like to have
an output measure that reflects this diversity. Unfortunately, however, two
major factors militate against this. First ton-mile data are not available by
broad commodity type; 7 and second, if one estimates a flexible-form second-order
approximation of a cost function, an output vector that fully captured the
heterogeneity of rail output would generate too many parameters to be estimated.
In this cost function we use an aggregate output measure of ton-miles, but take
the composition of output into effect by respectively using as technological
variables coal and agricultural tons carried as a percent of total tons
carried.8 This breakdown of output is not only useful because of the special-
ized equipment used for coal and agricultural traffic, but also because of the
current policy debate concerning the rate structure facing captive coal shippers.
The variable factors used in the cost function are labor, fuel, equipment
4capital, and materials and supplies. Price indices for fuel and for materials
and supplies are published by the Association of American Railroads on a regional
basis and are allocated to the railroads in the sample on this basis. The price
index for equipment capital measures the user cost of equipment for each railroad
and each year in the sample. 9 The price of labor was developed by aggregating
the seventy-eight different categories of rail labor provided annually by the ICC
A-200 wage schedules for each railroad into seven categories, and then using a
Divisia index to construct an annual aggregate labor price index for each
railroad.
Way and structures (ws) capital represents roadbed, track, bridges, etc.
Since this is typically long-lived, we treat it as a fixed factor. Measures of
ws capital were estimated following the procedures outlined by Friedlaender and
Spady (1981), which in turn were based on internal capital stock data provided
by Nelson (1974). The approach is relatively straightforward and is based on the
perpetual inventory identity
Kt - Kt_1 (1 - 6t ) + It
where Kt represents capital at the end of the period t, It represents the in-
vestment during period t, and at represents the rate of depreciation. Since the
ICC has made a number of changes in its accounting rules during the sample
period, the specific methodology followed was quite complex and the interested
reader is referred to Vellturo (1989).
Because of the importance of the nature of the rail network, it is desir-
able to include technological variables that reflect principal features of the
network and of rail operations. Ideally, we would like to utilize measures that
reflect the connectivity and density of the network.10 Because of the lack of
available data, however, we are limited to using route miles and average length
5of haul as measures of the network and its utilization. A time trend (T) was
included to capture any unexplained productivity growth. In addition, to capture
the effects of deregulation and mergers, additional time trends were added to
reflect the number of years since the latest merger for the affected firms (Tm)
and the number of years since deregulation (Tr).ll Table 1 provides data on
the means and standard deviation of the variables used in the sample.
Since rail technology is highly complex, it is unlikely that an economet-
ric cost function will fully encompass all of the elements that affect it.
Fortunately, a significant number of these unobserved variables relate to the
network structure and geographic configuration of each railroad -- functions that
remain relatively unchanged over the sample period. Consequently we introduced
firm-specific indicator variables (F) to capture these unobserved network effects
as well as any firm-specific differences in technology that are not related to
the operations of the firm.1 2
2.2 Sample. The rail cost function was estimated using panel data consisting
of major Class I railroads for the period 1974-1986. Of the 56 railroads that
had Class I status in 1974 only 21 reported data in 1986. From these systems, 27
were found to have complete and consistent data and thus formed the basis for our
analysis. In addition, a significant number of mergers occurred during this
period. To handle this problem, each merged system was treated as a separate
observation. Thus as railroads merged, they disappeared from our sample and were
replaced by a newly merged rail system; of the 27 rail systems used in our
analysis, only 9 were observed for all 13 years in the sample (1974-1986). Since
certain roads ceased to exist upon consolidation into other new systems, the
data panel is not balanced. 1 3 The names of the firms used in the sample and
their abbreviations are given in Table 2.
Table 1
Mean and Standard Deviation of Variables used
in Analysis of Railroad Costs
Units Mean Std Dev. Min Max
Variable Cost
Price of Labor
Price of Equip
Price of Fuel
Price of M+S
Ton Miles
Pct Agriculture
Pct Coal
WS Capital
ALH
Track Miles
$ bila 1.141
$ of comp/hr 9.677
Index
Index
Index
bil
0.396
1.637
1.728
45.245
% points 19.117
% points 26.403
$ bil
1,000 mi
1,000 mi
Year
Labor Expend
Equip Expend
Fuel Expend
M+S Expend
Labor Share
Equip Share
Fuel Share
M+S Share
$ bil
$ bil
$ bil
$ bil
1.906
0.392
7.930
6.476
0.460
0.373
0.116
0.192
0.397
0.333
0.105
0.165
1.148
2.843
0.131
0.742
0.260
41.876
9.025
17.816
1.923
0.145
6.428
3.594
0.464
0.416
0.123
0.205
0.081
0.091
0.039
0.064
0.019
5.390
0.190
0.684
0.652
1.910
5.040
17.740
0.674
2.844
1.495
203.000
6.298 69.175
0.291 79.378
0.118
0.173
0.543
8.303
0.780
25.810
1.000 13.000
0.004
0.003
0.003
0.001
0.105
0.068
0.036
0.008
1.940
2.175
0.547
1.137
0.664
0.585
0.301
0.459
a All costs and prices are in constant 1974 dollars.
Table 2
US CLASS I RAILROADS, 1974-86
Railraod System Abbreviation Years in Sample
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe ATSF 74-86
Burlington Northern BN 74-79
Chicago, Northwest Transit CNWT 74-86
Colorado Southern CS 74-81
Denver, Rio Grande Western DRGW 74-85
Fort Worth, Denver FWD 74-81
Grand Trunk Western GTW 75-86
Illinois Central Gulf ICG 74-86
Kansas City Southern KCS 74-86
Missouri-Kansas-Texas MKT 74-86
Missouri Pacific MP 74-82
Norfolk & Western NW 74-81
St. Louis, San Francisco SLSF 74-79
Soo Line SOO 74-86
Southern Pacific SP 74-86
Southern Railway System SOU 74-81
Union Pacific Railway UP 74-82
Western Pacific WP 74-82
Consolidated Rail Corp. CRC 77-86
Chessie System CHESSIE 74-80
Seaboard System SBD 74-80
CSX Corporation (1981-82) CSX1 81-82
CSX Corporation (1983-86) CSX2 83-86
Burlington Northern - St. Louis System BNSL 80-81
Burlington Northern System BNSYS 82-86
Union Pacific System UPSYS 83-86
Norfolk-Southern Corporation NSC 82-86
2.3 Econmetric Specification. To estimate rail costs, we utilize the
familiar translog cost function and its associated (n-l) factor share equations,
which take the following form:14
In(CV) = A0
n m
+ " Ailn(wi) + Blln(y) + E Cjln(tj) + D1 (T) + Ml(Tm)
n n
+R1(Tr) + .5 AAicln(wi)ln(wc) + .5BB 1 1 (ln(y)) 2
i=l c=l
n n m
+ • ABilln(wi)ln(y) + i • ACijln(wi)ln(tj)
i=1 i=1 j=1
m m m
+ E BCjlln(tj)ln(y) + .5C E CCjhln(tj)ln(th)j=1 j-=1 h=1
n
+ BDllln(y)(T) + I ADilln(wi)(T)
i=1
n n
+ i ADi2ln(wi)(T m) + i. ADi 2ln(wi)(Tr) + AJ) 4 MDUM
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+ ADi2T m + ADi3Tr
(3)
where i, c - 1,...,n is the number of inputs
j, h - 1,...,m is the number of technological variables
In estimating this equation system, we encountered a number of economet-
ric issues. Of these, the most significant are the appropriate treatment of the
error structures; the specification of fixed effects and their associated coef-
ficient restrictions; and output endogeneity.
We assume that the cost equation and its associated factor share equa-
tions have an additive error structure of the following form:
(2)
CvCrt = F(w, y, t, T, XF; 3) rt + ert, r = 1...R; t = 1...,T (4)
Sirt = G(w, y, t, T, x F ;J) rt + girt, i = 1,..n
where the variables have their previous definitions, P represents the vector of
parameters associated with the estimated equations, and r and t represent an
index over the observations. We decompose each error term into three components:
a firm specific error (ar and air); an error that exhibits first order autocorre-
lation within a given equation (bt and yit; we assume no error autocorrelation
across equations); and a normally distributed term that may be contemporaneously
correlated across equations only (crt and Iirt): Thus
ert - ar + bt + crt; r - 1,...,R; t - 1,...,T (5)
girt - air + Oit + Oirt; i - 1,...,n
To motivate this stochastic specification, we begin by considering the
origin of the firm specific error terms (ar and air). We interpret these firm-
specific disturbances as reflecting unobserved fundamental network differences
among Class I railroads (e.g., the spatial configurations of their routes, whe-
ther networks are primarily hub-and-spoke, end-to-end, etc.). Since it is reason-
able to assume that this network configuration effect is fixed over time for a
given railroad, we can eliminate this firm-specific error component by introduc-
ing indicator variables for each firm. We also assume that the underlying net-
work configuration influences input utilization by firms, that these network at-
tributes are known to each railroad, and therefore that they enter in its cost-
minimizing decisions. 1 5  We implement these assumptions by introducing dummy
variables into the linear terms of the input share equations and, for consisten-
cy, as interactive slope dummy variables on the linear price terms in the cost
equation, constraining their coefficient values to equal those in the input share
equations.16 17
Intra-equation intertemporal effects are introduced by permitting the bt and
Yit terms to follow first-order autoregressive processes. Although equal across
firms, we specify that the first order autoregresssive parameter in the cost
function disturbance term bt differs from that in the share equation disturbance
terms yit. To ensure adding-up consistency, we also specify that the autoregress-
ive parameter for each share equation is equal across shares. 1 8
Third, cross-equation contemporaneous correlation of the crt and the wirt
terms is expected, due to the adding up of the share equations. Therefore, we
specify that the n-element disturbance vector consisting of the crt and n-l wirt
terms is independent and multivariate normally distributed, with mean vector zero
and covariance matrix Ort, Finally, on the basis of an examination of residuals,
we determined that heteroskedasticity occurred in both the share and cost
function equations, with the variance of the residuals being positively related
to the In(yht). To transform the model so that the disturbance terms became ho-
moskedastic, we therefore divided all variables by the square root of In(yht).
In the context of stochastic specification, one final matter deserves par-
ticular attention: the endogeneity or exogeneity of output, y, ALOH, and the com-
position of output variables, %AG and %COAL. Because of the rate setting freedom
introduced by the Staggers Act, it is important to determine whether output and
its composition should be treated as being endogenous, particularly after 1978,
when the railroads began to obtain substantial rate-setting flexibility. To test
for the validity of the exogeneity assumption, we utilized Hausman's specifica-
tion procedure (1978) and decisively rejected the null hypothesis of exogeneity
of output. 1 9
Insofar as output and its components are determined endogenously through the
11
profit-maximizing behavior of railroads, they should be related to demand vari-
ables that do not enter the cost function. Consequently we utilized as instru-
ments appropriate firm-specific demand-related variables, including coal produc-
tion, mine-mouth prices, oil rates, farm income, and value of shipments from man-
ufacturing.20
2.4 The Estimated Cost Function. We estimate the system of equations con-
sisting of the cost function and the n-1 cost share equations (eq (2) and (3)),
omitting the linearly dependent M&S cost share equation, and using 3SLS and the
previously described instrumental variables for the endogenous variables and
their transforms (y, ALOH, %AG, %COAL). Based on the residuals of the 3SLS model,
we estimated a common autoregressive parameter for the three share equations, and
another autoregressive parameter for the cost function. Since the null hypothesis
that these two autoregressive parameters were simultaneously equal to zero was
not rejected at usual significance levels,2 1 we consequently set these auto-
correlation coefficients to zero.
The 3SLS estimated model had one additional drawback, in that curvature re-
strictions involving ws capital were frequently violated.22 To deal with this
problem we constrained the coefficient on the squared ws term (CC1 1) to equal
zero.23 Once this restriction was imposed, curvature restrictions were satis-
fied for 195 of the 229 observations. Parameter estimates and t-statistics (based
on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors) for the common parameters are given
in Table 3, with the firm-specific effects given in Table 4.24 Note that since
the cost function was estimated using actual observations rather than by using
the observation as deviations from the grand sample mean, the specific coeffi-
cients cannot be inferred as measuring a given cost elasticity at the sample
mean.25 For the most part the signs of the coefficients are as expected,
Table 3
3SLS PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR RESTRICTED TRANSLOG SHORT-RUN COST FUNCTION
("t-stat" is the Ratio of Parameter Estimate to its Asymptotic Standard Error)
US Class I Railroads, 1974-1986
Variable Estimate t-Stat Parameter Variable Estimate t-Stat
B1
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
AB1 1
AB21
AB31
AB41
AC11
AC2 1
AC31
AC4 1
AC12
AC22
AC32
AC4 2
AC13
AC2 3
AC33
AC4 3
AC 14
AC2 4
AC 34
AC4 4
AC15
AC2 5
AC35
AC4 5
ADT1
ADT2
ADT3
ADT4
R1
R11
AD12
AD22
AD 32
AD4 2
y
K
ALOH
MILES
% AG
% Coal
Y'PL
Y' PE
Y'PF
Y'PM+S
PL' K
PE'K
PF'K
PM+S K
PL'ALOH
PE'ALOH
PF' ALOH
PM+S'ALOH
PL.MILES
PE MILES
PF MILES
PM+S'MILES
PL.%AG
PE'%AG
PF'%AG
PM+S'%AG
PL.%COAL
PE*%COAL
PF.%COAL
PM+S'%COAL
PL. TIME
PE. TIME
PF. TIME
PM+S TIME
tr
tr2
PL tr
PE tr
PF tr
PM+S'tr
5.5726
1.3454
-3.1596
-7.1830
4.6114
-2.0086
0.0442
-0.2042
0.0766
0.0835
0.0860
0.0567
0.0519
-0.1945
-0.0032
0.1228
0.0219
-0.1415
0.0437
0.0095
-0.0226
-0.0306
0.0487
-0.0404
0.0023
-0.0106
-0.0144
0.0161
-0.0205
0.0188
0.0009
0.0009
-0.0125
0.0107
-0.0909
-0.0537
-0.0064
0.0009
0.0108
-0.0053
3.09
1.26
-1.20
-3.00
2.88
-3.39
1.68
-10.00
3.69
2.12
1.26
0.90
1.89
-3.20
0.07
3.11
0.61
-1.90
1.24
0.31
-1.53
-0.72
1.87
-2.02
0.85
-0.23
-2.11
3.16
-3.63
2.00
0.27
0.27
-5.13
2.50
-2.96
-6.25
-1.35
0.20
3.52
-0.94
AAl
AA2 2
AA33
AA44
AA1 2
AA1 3
AA14
AA 2 3
AA24
AA3 4
BC11
BC1 2
BC1 3
BC1 4
BC1 5
BB1 1
CC1 1
CC1 2
CC1 3
CC1 4
CC1 5
CC2 2
CC2 3
CC24
CC25
CC33
CC34
CC3 5
CC4 4
CC4 5
CC5 5
DT
DTT
M1I
M11i
AD4
AD1 3
AD2 3
AD33
AD4 3
NOTES: Prices, output quantity, K, ALOH, MILES, %AG, %COAL are all logarith-
mically transformed. TIME, tm (years since last merger) and tr (years since
deregulation) are all in natural units. Standard error estimates employ the
Halbert White [1980] heteroskedasticity-robust computation.
Parameter
PL PL
PE' PE
PF' PF
PM+S" PM+S
PL PE
PL"PF
PL" PM+S
PE' PF
PE' PM+S
PF' PM+S
K' y
ALOH" y
MILES" y
%AG" y
%COAL- y
y'y
K'K
ALOH" K
MILES" K
%AG' K
%COAL- K
ALOH ALOH
ALOH* MILES
ALOH"%AG
ALOH %COAL
MILES- MILES
MILES*%AG
MILES"%COAL
%AG %AG
%AG"%COAL
%COAL"%COAL
TIME
TIME- TIME
tm
tm2
MDUM
PL tm
PE tm
PF" tm
PM+S .t m
0.1654
0.1530
0.0791
0.1253
-0.1298
-0.0128
-0.0228
0.0064
-0.0296
-0.0728
0.6115
0.0375
-0.5425
0.1882
0.0130
0.0899
0.0000
-0.5618
-0.4126
0.5892
-0.1630
1.0303
0.2689
-0.5902
-0.1494
1.0130
-0.6779
0.1947
0.1160
-0.0759
-0.0199
-0.1284
0.0509
-0.0718
0.0097
-0.0724
-0.0029
0.0009
0.0108
-0.0053
2.89
3.26
8.04
2.10
-4.52
-0.80
-0.40
0.35
-0.80
-3.39
3.01
0.11
1.95
0.98
0.21
0.25
-2.25
-2.27
3.47
-3.85
2.27
0.65
-2.92
-1.37
2.86
-3.13
2.52
0.58
-1.17
-1.30
-4.10
5.37
-2.40
2.29
-3.14
-0.83
0.20
3.52
0.94
Table 4
3SLS PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR FIRM-SPECIFIC COST AND FACTOR SHARE TERMS
TRANSLOG SHORT-RUN COST FUNCTION, US CLASS I RAILROADS, 1974-1986
(Asymptotic t-statistic based on robust standard errors)
Cost Function
Firm Estimate t-Stat
Labor Term Equipment Term Fuel Term
Estimate t-Stat Estimate t-Stat Estimate t-Stat
Base Firm:
ATSF 21.027
Other Firms:
BN
CNWT
CS
DRGW
FWD
GTW
ICG
KCS
MKT
MP
NW
SLSF
SOO
SPTC
SOU
UP
WP
CRC
CHES1
SBD
BNSL
BNSYS
CSX1
CSX2
NS
UPSYS
-0.095
-1.724
-2.906
-1.964
-4.152
-2.062
-0.828
-2.213
-1.994
-0.734
-0.020
-1.473
-1.933
0.152
-0.022
0.054
-2.459
0.025
0.116
-0.347
-0.147
-0.014
0.194
0.292
0.502
0.305
2.43
-0.47
-6.17
-3.62
-3.50
-5.41
-3.26
-3.69
-3.56
-3.45
-4.46
-0.09
-4.18
-4.73
1.52
-0.10
0.55
-3.81
0.06
0.34
-1.29
-0.57
-0.05
0.44
0.71
1.74
1.46
-0.708 1.92
-0.033
0.238
0.266
0.357
0.594
0.498
0.107
0.355
0.312
0.090
0.073
0.236
0.259
-0.044
0.016
0.005
0.323
0.068
0.073
0.009
-0.039
-0.070
-0.068
-0.052
-0.055
-0.067
-0.73
3.70
1.19
2.25
2.85
2.73
1.88
2.00
1.92
2.30
1.52
2.53
2.29
-2.10
0.32
0.24
2.11
0.66
1.10
0.17
-0.74
-1.22
-0.74
-0.59
-0.89
-1.40
1.500 5.57
-0.027
-0.130
-0.268
-0.220
-0.485
-0.241
-0.023
-0.114
-0.093
-0.008
0.081
-0.158
-0.165
0.072
0.097
0.007
-0.350
-0.190
0.069
0.138
-0.011
0.018
0.202
0.147
0.203
0.131
-0.68
-2.63
-1.33
-1.47
-2.52
-1.49
-0.74
-0.71
-0.64
-0.25
2.09
-1.90
-1.61
4.01
2.70
0.40
-2.42
-2.11
1.52
4.06
-0.22
0.32
2.65
2.00
3.95
2.94
0.003 0.02
-0.038
0.128
0.404
0.256
0.413
0.249
0.081
0.229
0.237
0.054
0.026
0.163
0.150
-0.068
0.038
0.011
0.204
-0.054
0.003
0.009
-0.024
-0.052
-0.073
-0.077
-0.049
-0.057
-2.04
3.05
3.59
2.96
4.50
2.41
1.86
2.56
3.07
1.91
0.64
3.35
2.65
-3.79
0.85
0.96
3.07
-0.99
0.05
0.16
-1.09
-2.20
-1.18
-1.32
-1.08
-2.34
Notes: BNSL and BNSYS represent the Burlington Northern System over two phases,
1979-80 (before the acquisition of FWD and CX), and 1981-86 (after the
acquisition). CSX1 and CSX2 represent the two phases of the CSX merger, 1981-
82 and 1983-86.
SUMMARY ESTIMATION STATISTICS
VARIABLE COSTS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NLVARC
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE
STANDARD DEVIATION
R-SQUARED
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC (ADJ. FOR 5 GAPS)
0.259146
0.336399E-01
0.686188
0.960150
0.998767
0.998772
1.8370
LABOR 
SHARE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NSHLAB
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE
STANDARD DEVIATION
R-SQUARED
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC (ADJ. FOR 5 GAPS)
0.768320E-01
0.183170E-01
0.233328
0.746357E-01
0.939519
0.939783
1.3988
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:NSHEQU
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE
STANDARD DEVIATION
R-SQUARED
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC (ADJ. FOR 5 GAPS)
0.421776E-01
0.135714E-01
0.199096
0.814680E-01
0.972142
0.972263
1.7569
UF EL 
SHARE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NSHFUE
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS
STANDARD ERROR OR THE REGRESSION
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE
STANDARD DEVIATION
R- SQUARED
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC (ADJ. FOR 5 GAPS)
0.355162E-01
0.124536E-01
0.631667E-01
0.348041E-01
0.871410
0.871971
1.2696
EQUATION:
EOUATION:
EQUATION: QE UIPMENT 
SHARE
OE UATION:
VARIABLE COSTS
VnU Trl . uy L~rn· uro~
_- _ - -- -... . . ... . .. . .
and the parameters are generally significant.26
3. Size, Scale, and Capital Adjustments
We now turn to the question of the technological structure of the rail in-
dustry and the nature of its capital adjustments in response to the Staggers Act.
We begin by discussing the nature and extent of scale economies in the industry
and then evaluate the amount and costs of the capital disequilibrium that exists
within the industry.
3.1 Returns to Scale and to Size. In most industries, the concept of eco-
nomies of scale is straightforward and relates the change in the firm's level of
costs to changes in its level of output. Intuitively, the elasticity of cost
(Ey) reflects the percentage change in cost relative to the percentage change in
output (dC/C)/(dy/y), and diseconomies or economies of scale exist as Ey is
greater or less than one, with constant returns to scale occurring if Ey - 1.
The accepted measure of economies of scale (Sy) is simply given by the reciprocal
of the firm's elasticity of cost and is thus measured by the ratio of average
cost to marginal cost. Thus a firm is said to be' subject to increasing,
constant, or decreasing returns to scale as Sy is greater than, equal to, or less
than one.
In considering size-related economies of scale in the railroad industry, it
is important to differentiate between output-related economies (which arise from
changes in the different components of output) and size related economies (which
arise from changes in the technological environment in which the railroad
operates). In each case, however, it is useful to note that these are condi-
tional on the level of output and ws capital, and thus only present a partial
equilibrium view of the adjustment process. 2 7
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Following most analyses of output related measures of returns to scale in
the rail industry (e.g., Keeler (1983), Caves et al. (1985)), we focus on returns
to scale associated with a given increase in tonnage, which is typically referred
to as economies of density.2 8 This is simply given as
S, = [alnC / alny]- (6)
In addition to measuring output elated economies, it is also useful to
measure size-related economies that incorporate changes in the physical envi-
ronment in which the firm operates. In this case it is natural to consider si-
multaneous changes in the output of the firm and its network,2 9 conditional
upon the level of the fixed factor (either actual or optimal). 3 0 In this case,
the extension of the previous analysis is straightforward, and we include miles
of track (N) in our analysis of size-related economies, given by
S, = [8lnC/alny + alnC/alnN] - (7)
To date, we have not differentiated between short-run and long-run eco-
nomies of scale. Because of the large amounts of fixed capital embodied in the
railroads' way and structure, it is important to consider the relationship be-
tween the opportunity cost of capital and the firm's shadow value of capital.
The formal relationships between short-run scale economies, the shadow value of
capital, and long-run returns to scale can be seen by considering the following
total cost function:
CT = CV(y, w, t, XF) + p* xF (8)
where CT represents total costs, p* represents the opportunity cost of capital,
and the other variables have their previous meaning.
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It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium capital stock is obtained
when the opportunity cost of capital equals the firm's shadow value of capital,
which represents the savings in variable cost if the stock of capital were raised
by one unit, i.e.,
aCV(y,w,t,T,xF) (9)
= - p (9)
axF
By using equation (9) it is possible to calculate x*F, which can then be substi-
tuted into equation (8) to yield estimates of the long-run cost elasticities.
Returns to scale are then given by the reciprocal of the relevant long-run
elasticity of cost with respect to output.
Because of the importance of rail rates on captive coal shippers in the
current policy debate and the relationship between revenue adequacy and returns
to scale, we analyze the behavior of the five railroads that are heavy coal car-
riers (Burlington Northern, Conrail, CSX System, Norfolk Southern System, and the
Denver Rio Grande). In addition, because of the number of significant mergers
that have taken place during the past decade, it is useful to focus on the merged
rail systems (the four large coal systems, plus the Union Pacific System) to see
if they have behaved differently from the other railroads. Finally, for purposes
of comparison we will consider the behavior of a number of representative non-
coal, non-merged rail systems: the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe (a large Western
road), the Illinois, Central Gulf (a large Southern road), the Grand Trunk West-
ern (small Eastern Road), the Missouri Kansas Southern (a small Western road),
and the Soo (a small Western Road).
Table 5 presents data on the short-run and long-run ton-related economies
of scale and their associated standard errors. Although some of the standard
errors are large relative to the point estimates, the scale economies are
TABLE 5
ECONOMIES OF SCALE, BY RAILROAD, SELECTED YEARS
NO NETWORK EFFECTS NETWORK EFFECTS
SHORT RUN
VALUE ST ERR
bn
mean
74
79
84
86
drg
mean
74
79
84
crc
mean
79
84
86
sbd
mean
74
79
chessie
mean
74
79
csx
mean
84
86
nw
mean
74
79
sou
mean
74
79
nsc
mean
84
86
0.691
0.472
0.622
0.839
0.715
0.642
0.454
0.561
0.940
0.260
0.227
0.312
0.249
1.375
1.406
0.386
0.358
0.386
0.337
0.664
0.711
0.549
0.276
0.339
0.282
0.319
0.407
0.345
0.314
0.343
0.493
LONG RUN
VALUE ST ERR
3.966
na
2.558
na
30.303
2.237
2.247
2.105
2.304
1.848
1.783
2.203
1.721
3.968
6.757
3.597
1.658
1.795
1.553
3.083
2.770
2.994
1.969
6.452
1.832
2.066
2.545
2.028
3.968
5.376
2.278
4.239
na
0.985
na
281.252
0.510
0.415
0.451
0.691
0.312
0.339
0.426
0.240
2.520
8.413
2.149
0.332
0.395
0.303
5.889
1.162
1.497
0.681
13.182
0.617
4.630
0.798
0.532
2.993
6.802
0.599
SHORT RUN
VALUE ST ERR
1.214
1.370
1.103
1.325
1.391
1.038
1.211
1.021
0.984
1.193
1.086
1.383
1.235
1.056
1.121
1.036
0.947
1.000
0.931
0.974
0.964
1.015
1.242
1.366
1.225
1.206
1.232
1.222
1.073
1.160
0.982
0.764
0.267
0.197
0.319
0.330
0.170
0.184
0.164
0.189
0.136
0.139
0.156
0.139
0.163
0.177
0.167
0.116
0.133
0.117
0.147
0.149
0.160
0.238
0.315
0.247
0.182
0.179
0.214
0.160
0.193
0.133
LONG RUN
VALUE ST ERR
1.063
1.295
1.066
1.255
1.261
1.309
1.351
1.292
1.325
0.978
0.964
1.027
1.001
1.042
1.076
1.024
0.983
0.992
0.974
0.929
0.926
0.955
1.250
1.508
1.232
1.193
1.205
1.212
1.076
1.130
0.971
0.260
0.407
0.199
0.430
0.402
0.217
0.207
0.209
0.257
0.119
0.138
0.124
0.115
0.171
0.198
0.173
0.119
0.133
0.120
0.151
0.151
0.168
0.274
0.538
0.281
0.190
0.192
0.225
0.208
0.260
0.135
2.343
2.155
2.203
2.439
2.347
2.433
2.415
2.421
2.410
1.567
1.414
1.812
1.553
3.125
3.236
3.049
1.715
1.783
1.637
2.219
2.331
2.096
1.447
1.462
1.403
1.832
2.024
1.767
1.802
1.733
2.137
TABLE 5, CONT
ECONOMIES OF SCALE, BY RAILROAD, SELECTED YEARS
NO NETWORK EFFECTS NETWORK EFFECTS
SHORT RUN
VALUE ST ERR
mp
mean
75
79
up
mean
75
79
ups
mean
84
86
atsf
mean
79
84
86
gtw
mean
75
79
84
86
icg
mean
74
79
84
86
mkt
mean
74
79
84
86
soo
mean
74
79
84
86
3.030
2.545
3.165
1.712
1.825
1.698
2.222
2.203
2.381
1.866
1.838
1.905
1.835
1.681
1.502
1.715
1.866
1.972
2.146
2.387
2.247
2.203
1.592
2.703
2.865
2.457
2.740
3.300
4.274
3.831
3.731
3.610
7.519
LONG RUN
VALUE' ST ERR
0.842
0.415
1.167
0.333
0.322
0.356
0.548
0.554
0.617
0.388
0.375
0.421
0.422
0.427
0.420
0.489
0.406
0.522
0.293
0.415
0.395
0.293
0.233
0.398
0.710
0.364
0.474
0.633
1.800
1.598
1.497
1.467
6.913
5.747
na
na
3.984
5.917
3.333
13.699
na
6.993
3.690
na
na
2.398
1.437
1.437
1.462
1.453
1.541
3.096
3.484
3.077
2.882
2.732
3.390
10.989
2.433
3.876
2.681
8.772
11.111
20.408
na
9.804
SHORT RUN
VALUE ST ERR
4.614
na
na
3.322
7.498
2.356
46.102
na
10.397
2.601
na
na
0.905
0.361
0.398
0.397
0.307
0.377
0.804
1.206
8.530
0.607
0.863
0.695
12.820
0.358
1.488
0.414
10.287
15.595
58.064
na
12.765
1.412
1.664
1.397
1.493
1.555
1.468
1.239
1.290
1.215
1.395
1.504
1.427
1.318
1.305
1.517
1.397
1.300
1.034
1.266
1.241
1.256
1.248
1.481
1.815
2.439
1.754
1.739
1.460
1.859
1.916
1.976
2.079
1.437
LONG RUN
VALUE ST ERR
0.240
0.273
0.271
0.364
0.358
0.376
0.258
0.288
0.241
0.313
0.396
0.332
0.269
0.300
0.410
0.364
0.289
0.208
0.112
0.115
0.128
0.102
0.182
0.353
0.626
0.363
0.338
0.232
0.369
0.344
0.417
0.465
0.222
1.109
1.175
1.462
1.488
1.645
1.550
1.006
1.610
1.179
1.010
2.688
1.550
1.272
1.403
1.555
1.475
1.374
1.248
1.192
1.142
1.196
1.168
1.362
1.845
2.506
1.754
1.742
1.531
1.698
1.757
1.976
2.119
1.429
0.392
0.793
0.000
0.528
0.522
0.494
0.438
0.812
0.290
0.622
2.282
0.540
0.282
0.315
0.415
0.371
0.293
0.245
0.126
0.126
0.141
0.107
0.210
0.380
0.816
0.363
0.371
0.240
0.413
0.360
0.512
0.648
0.229
typically estimated with an acceptable level of precision. When the network is
held fixed, the estimates of returns to scale (given under the heading "no
network effects") of are uniformly greater than one, and substantially so in many
cases. Thus, given the large amounts of fixed track and ws capital, there are
substantial returns to density as utilization increases. Moreover, if capital is
adjusted in an optimal fashion, the returns to scale are somewhat larger,
indicating that increasing returns is not a transitory phenomenon due to
excessive capital, but may be an inherent characteristic of rail technology.
The network related measures of economies of scale (given under the
heading "network effects") assume proportional increases in tonnage and route
miles. These are substantially lower than the measures that assu es a change in
tons alone. This is to be expected, since service standards and the cost of
maintaining the track rise as the network expands. However, in most cases the
point estimate is still greater than one in both the short and the long run,
although the standard errors indicate that this difference is not generally
statistically significant. Nevertheless, on balance these estimates suggest that
economies of scale are an inherent aspect of rail technolgy. 3 1
3.2. Capital Adjustments and Excess Capacity, Table 6 presents the shadow
price of capital, the opportunity cost, and the marginal q for the railroads
discussed in this analysis. Since the marginal q represents the ratio of the
absolute value of the return of a marginal dollar of investment in way and
structures capital (the shadow price of capital) to the opportunity cost of
capital, its value indicates whether a firm is overcapitalized or undercap-
italized. In the case of overcapitalization, the value of the marginal product
of capital is less than its opportunity cost and the marginal q is less than one.
TABLE 6
MEASURES OF CAPITAL AND CAPITAL
DISEQUILIBRIUM, BY RAILROAD, SELECTED YEARS
SHADOW OPPTUNTY MARG Q ROR
PRICE COST CAPITALYear
bn
mean
74
79
84
86
drg
mean
74
79
84
crc
mean
79
84
86
sbd
mean
74
79
chessie
mean
74
79
csx
mean
84
86
nw
mean
74
79
sou
mean
74
79
nsc
mean
84
86
0.0737
0.0266
0.1067
0.0437
0.0405
0.3437
0.2061
0.3532
0.4326
0.0567
0.0585
0.0512
0.0512
0.1133
0.0828
0.1201
0.1652
0.1265
0.1788
0.1056
0.1260
0.0815
0.0820
0.0348
0.0792
0.1080
0.0935
0.1022
0.0820
0.0556
0.1230
0.1463
0.1323
0.1383
0.1640
0.1366
0.1511
0.1362
0.1415
0.1693
0.1388
0.1293
0.1574
0.1201
0.1370
0.1341
0.1398
0.1371
0.1311
0.1400
0.1668
0.1655
0.1366
0.1323
0.1256
0.1302
0.1332
0.1323
0.1302
0.1543
0.1640
0.1366
0.5039
0.2013
0.7712
0.2666
0.2966
2.2742
1.5141
2.4955
2.5545
0.4087
0.4526
0.3252
0.4264
0.8265
0.6179
0.8587
1.2049
0.9653
1.2767
0.6329
0.7613
0.5962
0.6196
0.2773
0.6079
0.8108
0.7064
0.7850
0.5312
0.3388
0.9002
WS
CAPITAL
($ BIL)
4.667
4.293
4.202
5.238
5.252
0.386
0.368
0.374
0.413
7.723
7.982
7.362
7.042
2.652
2.697
2.662
3.105
3.304
2.995
5.765
5.745
5.784
3.948
1.918
1.873
1.803
1.718
1.836
3.948
3.953
3.884
MILES WS CAP/
TRACK MI TR
($ MIL)
0.0769
0.0706
0.0595
0.1315
0.1086
0.0258
0.0788
0.0471
0.0098
0.0433
0.0355
0.0661
0.0647
0.0337
0.0930
0.0126
0.0284
0.1031
0.0046
-0.0070
0.0188
-0.1215
-0.2125
0.1257
0.0436
0.0536
0.1423
0.0338
-0.0330
-0.0322
-0.0198
23071
21466
21009
24944
22834
1752
1840
1779
1719
14573
15651
13147
12354
14731
14985
14788
7962
8261
7680
20838
19810
19279
10671
5046
5062
4044
4117
4006
12736
10980
16183
0.202
0.200
0.200
0.210
0.230
0.220
0.200
0.210
0.240
0.530
0.510
0.560
0.570
0.180
0.180
0.180
0.390
0.400
0.390
0.277
0.290
0.300
0.370
0.380
0.370
0.446
0.417
0.458
0.310
0.360
0.240
TABLE 6, CONT
MEASURES OF CAPITAL AND CAPITAL
DISEQUILIBRIUM, BY RAILROAD, SELECTED YEARS
OPPTUNTY MARG Q
COSTYear
mp
mean
75
79
up
mean
75
78
ups
mean
84
86
atsf
mean
79
84
86
gtw
mean
75
79
84
86
icg
mean
74
79
84
86
mkt
mean
74
79
84
86
soo
mean
74
79
84
86
SHADOW
PRICE
0.0709
0.0271
0.0621
0.0539
0.0473
0.0589
0.0416
0.0208
0.0629
0.0500
0.0124
0.0475
0.0845
0.2860
0.1705
0.2766
0.3282
0.4443
0.0900
0.0759
0.0897
0.1077
0.0520
0.1480
0.0708
0.1598
0.1322
0.2481
0.0920
0.0699
0.0738
0.0639
0.1318
ROR WS
CAPITAL CAPITAL
($ BIL)
0.1454
0.1419
0.1383
0.1360
0.1257
0.1302
0.1515
0.1640
0.1366
0.1408
0.1302
0.1640
0.1366
0.1470
0.1358
0.1517
0.1546
0.1361
0.1524
0.1323
0.1415
0.1724
0.1504
0.1737
0.1647
0.1573
0.1846
0.1752
0.1480.
0.1362
0.1415
0.1640
0.1442
0.4876
0.1910
0.4492
0.3964
0.3764
0.4522
0.2748
0.1268
0.4606
0.3551
0.0955
0.2895
0.6183
1.9456
1.2554
1.8233
2.1228
3.2643
0.5906
0.5738
0.6342
0.6249
0.3455
0.8520
0.4298
1.0160
0.7162
1.4162
0.6216
0.5133
0.5215
0.3895
0.9140
MILES WS CAP/
TRACK MI TR($ MIL)
0.0791
0.1541
0.1150
0.0492
0.0683
0.1616
0.0401
0.0160
0.0868
-0.0770
0.0312
0.0081
-0.0036
-0.1147
0.0105
-0.1091
-0.0772
-0.0815
-0.0179
0.0575
-0.0176
-0.0357
-0.0879
0.2804
0.0064
-0.0483
-0.0444
-0.0797
0.0279.
0.1229
0.0635
0.0397
0.1000
1.475
1.339
1.474
1.971
1.857
2.009
4.143
4.136
4.234
2.430
2.320
2.449
2.538
0.243
0.250
0.243
0.241
0.245
1.598
1.779
1.624
1.487
1.396
0.265
0.279
0.251
0.276
0.276
0.502
0.545
0.486
0.488
0.512
9831
7876
10529
8569
8843
8371
19727
19693
19248
11615
11686
11395
11146
959
829
913
1060
1056
7380
8929
8262
6486
3608
1767
1902
1627
1920
1884
4467
4353
4376
4198
6263
0.150
0.170
0.140
0.230
0.210
0.240
0.210
0.210
0.220
0.209
0.199
0.215
0.228
0.253
0.301
0.266
0.227
0.232
0.217
0.199
0.197
0.229
0.387
0.150
0.147
0.154
0.144
0.146
0.112
0.125
0.111
0.116
0.082
In the case of undercapitalization, the converse is true.
In a regulated environment, the extent of overcapitalization or undercapit-
alization within the rail industry depends on two contradictory forces: (1) the
regulatory pressures to maintain common carrier obligations may require a capital
structure that is excessive for existing output levels, causing the marginal q
to be less than one; (2) the inability to earn a fair rate of return should pre-
vent the railroads from maintaining an adequate capital base, causing the
marginal q to exceed one. In a deregulated environment, however, railroads should
have the ability to reduce their capital stock to reflect their traffic needs,
thus reducing the pressure to remain overcapitalized. At the same time,
railroads have only been moderately successful in achieving a normal rate of
return. Thus one would expect the marginal q to rise during the sample period,
other things being equal. In addition, in so far as mergers have enabled the
railroads to facilitate their capital adjustments, we would expect the marginal
q to equilibrate faster for the merged than the unmerged firms.
With the exception of two small roads (the Denver Rio Grande and the Grand
Trunk Western), the railroads have maintained a marginal q well below one,
indicating that excess capacity is pervasive in the industry. Moreover, there
is no clear movement toward equilibrium in the post Staggers period. While some
railroads appear to have moved toward equilibrium under deregulation (Norfolk
Southern, Union Pacific System, Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe, Missouri Kansas
Texas, and Soo), others have moved away (Burlingron Northern, CSX, Illinois
Central Gulf). Furthermore, the performance of the merged firms is quite mixed,
with the Norfolk Southern and the Union Pacific System moving toward equilibrium
and the Burlington Northern and the CSX moving away.3 2 This suggests that the
reasons for the equilibrating behavior of these latter two systems are probably
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not due to merger activity per se, but are more likely to reflect managerial
activities and other considerations.
The pervasiveness of the low marginal q throughout the sample period is
surprising and suggests that there may be substantial barriers to the optimal
adjustment of capital. If railroads treat their ws capital as a sunk cost, as
long as they receive some return on the margin, they have little incentive to
abandon it. Alternatively, the cost savings from increments in ws capital may not
fully reflect the benefit of this investment. 3 3  In particular, if service
quality enters the demand function and service quality depends on the amount of
ws capital, it is likely that the shadow value of capital underestimates the true
benefits of investment and the marginal q would overestimate the degree of
overcapitalization.
Although it is not possible to address this issue fully without developing
a demand model, the data given in Table 6 on the amounts of ws capital, miles
of track, and ws capital per mile of track are suggestive. If, for example, regu-
lation forced the railroads to maintain a network in excess of optimal levels,
we would expect to observe substantial reductions in track in the post Staggers
period. Similarly, if the amount of ws capital embodied in the track had a signi-
ficant demand enhancing effect, we would expect to see the amount of ws capital
per mile of track to rise. Although the data in Table 6 are somewhat mixed in
this regard, they generally indicate increasing capital intensity of track after
deregulation (Burlington Northern, Conrail, Denver Rio Grande, Seabord/CSX,
Mopac/Union Pacific System, Atchison Topeka and Sante Fe, and the Illinois
Central Gulf), suggesting that there may well be unmeasured returns from enhanced
track quality.
It is possible to shed further light on this issue by considering the
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rate of return to capital earned by the railroads, which we define as [(R - VC)
/ XF] where R represents total revenues, and VC represents variable costs, and
xF represents ws capital. Thus while the shadow value represents the marginal
cost savings for an incremental unit of capital, the rate of return represents
the average return (including revenues) to the existing stock.
Table 6 indicates that as is true for the marginal q, most railroads ex-
hibit low rates of return, consistent with overcapitalization. In a few cases,
however, the two measures are at variance. For example, the marginal q's for the
Burlington Northern and Conrail are quite low, indicating overcapitalization.
In contrast, the rate of return for the Burlington Northern is well in excess of
the opportunity costs for 1984 and 1986, while for Conrail the rate of return and
opportunity costs are quite close to each other for the years in the sample. In
each case, the demand effects of ws investment are substantial: the Burlington
Northern invested heavily in new track in the Powder River Basin to permit it to
exploit its coal fields; Conrail essentially refurbished its capital (which had
been allowed to deteriorate during the bankruptcy of its constituent firms) to
permit enhanced service. Similarly, prior to its merger with the Union Pacific,
the Missouri Pacific had a reputation of delivering high-quality service. Thus
the cases in which the rate of return exceed the opportunity costs of capital are
consistent with ws investments influencing demand as well as reducing costs.
Nevertheless, on balance, the marginal q's and the rates of return to
capital investment indicate that the rail industry is generally overcapitalized
and in need of substantial capital reduction, which can only come about through
substantial reallocation of its ws capital. This can be seen from Table 7, which
indicates that the bulk of the railroads have experienced substantial overcapita-
lization throughout the sample period. However, the degree of overcapitalization
TABLE 7
ACTUAL AND OPTIMAL LEVELS OF CAPITAL AND TOTAL COSTS
BY RAILROAD, SELECTED YEARS
CAPITAL
Bil
Year ACTUAL
bn
mean 4.667
74 4.293
79 4.202
84 5.238
86 5.252
drg
mean 0.386
74 0.368
79 0.374
84 0.413
crc
mean 7.723
79 7.982
84 7.362
86 7.042
sbd
mean 2.652
74 2.697
79 2.662
chessie
mean 3.105
74 3.304
79 2.995
csx
mean 5.765
84 5.745
86 5.784
nw
mean 3.948
74 1.918
79 1.873
SOU
mean 1.803
74 1.718
79 1.836
nsc
mean 3.948
84 3.953
86 3.884
STOCK
$74
OPTIMAL
2.618
1.019
3.440
1.634
1.862
0.589
0.470
0.621
0.661
3.960
4.222
3.175
3.743
2.276
1.822
2.354
3.510
3.223
3.552
4.114
4.655
3.812
2.269
0.587
1.217
1.528
1.297
1.503
2.269
1.515
3.565
TOTAL COST
DIFFERENCE Bil $74
ACTUAL PERCENT ACTUAL OPTIMAL
2.050
3.274
0.762
3.604
3.390
-0.204
-0.102
-0.247
-0.249
3.764
3.760
4.188
3.299
0.376
0.876
0.308
-0.405
0.081
-0.557
1.651
1.090
1.972
1.679
1.330
0.656
0.275
0.422
0.333
1.679
2.438
0.319
43.919
76.257
18.139
68.808
64.545
-52.787
-27.791
-66.113
-60.255
48.728
47.110
56.878
46.849
14.171
32.464
11.584
-13.042
2.447
-18.590
28.636
18.977
34.092
42.525
69.366
35.042
15.252
24.535
18.132
42.525
61.671
8.213
2.091
1.565
2.084
2.559
1.955
0.210
0.160
0.217
0.250
2.525
2.944
2.282
1.879
1.543
1.348
1.717
1.521
1.417
1.658
3.406
3.394
2.749
2.329
1.036
1.208
1.043
0.911
1.127
2.416
2.359
2.279
1.981
1.310
2.071
2.256
1.733
0.193
0.157
0.197
0.225
2.324
2.779
1.989
1.738
1.534
1.322
1.714
1.513
1.417
1.648
3.308
3.370
2.687
2.288
0.952
1.189
1.038
0.902
1.122
2.288
2.184
2.276
DIFFERENCE
ACTUAL PERCENT
0.110
0.254
0.013
0.302
0.222
0.017
0.003
0.020
0.025
0.201
0.164
0.293
0.141
0.009
0.026
0.003
0.008
0.000
0.010
0.098
0.023
0.063
0.041
0.084
0.019
0.005
0.009
0.005
0.128
0.176
0.003
5.24
16.26
0.62
11.81
11.34
7.94
1.99
9.22
10.05
7.96
5.58
12.83
7.51
0.59
1.90
0.18
0.50
0.01
0.60
2.88
0.69
2.28
1.76
8.11
1.60
0.49
0.99
0.44
5.29
7.44
0.12
TABLE 7, CONT
ACTUAL AND OPTIMAL LEVELS OF CAPITAL AND TOTAL COSTS
BY RAILROAD, SELECTED YEARS
CAPITAL STOCK
Bil $74
Year ACTUAL OPTIMAL
mp
mean
75
79
up
mean
75
78
upsys
mean
84
86
atsf
mean
79
84
86
gtw
mean
75
79
84
86
icg
mean
74
79
84
86
mkt
mean
74
79
8486
soo
mean
74
798486
1.475
1.339
1.474
1.971
1.857
2.009
4.143
4.136
4.234
2.430
2.320
2.449
2.538
0.243
0.250
0.243
0.241
0.245
1.598
1.779
1.624
1.487
1.396
0.265
0.279
0.251
0.276
0.276
0.502
0.545
0.486
0.488
0.512
0.756
0.294
0.722
0.863
0.765
1.039
1.314
0.572
2.180
0.902
0.235
0.789
1.720
0.379
0.293
0.369
0.411
0.510
1.055
1.158
1.133
1.036
0.574
0.230
0.140
0.254
0.211
0.350
0.345
0.329
0.286
0.222
0.477
DIFFERENCE
ACTUAL PERCENT
0.719
1.045
0.752
1.108
1.092
0.970
2.828
3.564
2.055
1.528
2.085
1.660
0.818
-0.136
-0.044
-0.127
-0.171
-0.264
0.543
0.621
0.492
0.451
0.823
0.035
0.139
-0.003
0.066
-0.074
0.157
0.215
0.200
0.267
0.035
48.769
78.043
50.994
56.216
58.805
48.283
68.270
86.178
48.528
62.881
89.887
67.770
32.226
-55.967
-17.493
-52.209
-70.931
-107.772
33.980
34.909
30.263
30.339
58.922
13.208
49.760
-1.209
23.747
-26.719
31.275
39.508
41.178
54.608
6.787
TOTAL COST
Bil $74
ACTUAL OPTIMAL
0.901
0.633
0.955
1.184
0.941
1.229
2.416
2.648
2.172
1.500
1.466
1.624
1.253
0.195
0.137
0.193
0.233
0.210
0.754
0.695
0.782
0.789
0.583
0.175
0.133
0.162
0.209
0.194
0.235
0.191
0.226
0.241
0.316
0.857
0.543
0.920
1.122
0.888
1.176
2.179
2.241
2.078
1.392
1.262
1.491
1.229
0.187
0.137
0.186
0.221
0.182
0.729
0.675
0.768
0.773
0.529
0.172
0.125
0.162
0.207
0.192
0.227
0.182
0.218
0.224
0.316
DIFFERENCE
ACTUAL PERCENT
0.043
0.090
0.036
0.062
0.053
0.053
0.237
0.407
0.094
0.108
0.203
0.133
0.024
0.0080.001
0.007
0.012
0.028
0.025
0.020
0.014
0.017
0.053
0.003
0.008
0.000
0.002
0.002
0.008
0.009
0.008
0.017
0.000
4.82
14.22
3.74
5.21
5.67
4.29
9.81
15.36
4.31
7.21
13.88
8.20
1.94
3.97
0.51
3.41
5.01
13.43
3.26
2.92
1.84
2.10
9.14
1.73
6.12
0.01
0.90
1.25
3.40
4.46
3.57
7.10
0.07
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has fallen somewhat in the post-Staggers period for a number of railroads,
suggesting that deregulation has hastened capital adjustments in the rail system.
For example, relative to 1974 (the base year of comparison), the Burlington
Northern System, Norfolk Southern, Union Pacific System, the Atchison, Topeka,
and Santa Fe, the Missouri Kansas Texas, and the Soo have reduced their degree
of excess capacity, and in some cases substantially. In contrast, Conrail, the
CSX System, and the ICG have either maintained the same percentage degree of
excess capacity (or have increased it somewhat) during the sample period.
Even though some of the railroads have reduced their degree of excess
capacity, it remains large in absolute amounts. In particular, during the sample
period, the amount of aggregate excess capacity ranged from a low of $8.949
billion (in 1974) to a high of $16.908 billion (in 1984). 34  If we assume an
average opportunity cost of capital of 12%, this represents a partial deadweight
loss ranging from $1.074 billion (in 1974) to $2.038 billion (in 1984). On
average, over the sample period, the annual deadweight loss of excess capacity
was approximately $1.25 billion.3 5
In addition, it is useful to consider the cost differentials that are
created by this excess capacity. This is also given in Table 7, which presents
data on the short run fitted and optimal total costs for the railroads used in
our analysis. While the percentage difference between the fitted and optimal
total costs are much less than the actual and optimal value of the capital stock,
the aggregate cost differentials are substantial, ranging from a high of $1.407
billion in 1984 to a low of $0.557 billion in 1979. Although the excess costs
fell significantly in 1986, totalling $0.630 billion, it is difficult to extra-
polate from these figures, since the aggregate costs differentials exhibits sub-
stantial variation over the selected sample years. 3 6 Nevertheless, the data on
29
costs corroborate the findings that the costs of excess capacity are large and
pervasive.
5. Summary and Conclusions
The most striking aspect of this analysis is the apparent inability of
the rail industry to adjust its capital stock to reach a cost-minimizing equi-
librium. This is manifested by the consistently low values of the marginal q's;
the low rates of return; the relatively constant magnitude of the differentials
between the actual and the optimal capital stock, and the relative constancy
between the levels of actual and optimal costs.
This lack of rationalization of capital stock is particularly puzzling
in view of the large adjustments that have been made in rail labor 3 7, the appa-
rent responsiveness of the railroads to the rate freedom guaranteed to them by
the Staggers Act, and the legislative freedom guaranteed in that same Act to
rationalize route structures and abandon track.
One explanation for this behavior was alluded to above: namely that the
amount of ws capital not only affects costs, but also affects unmeasured service
quality and thus demand. Hence the cost-minimizing amount of ws capital may not
be consistent with the profit-maximizing level of ws capital, where the latter
includes service quality attributes. In view of the higher speeds and better
service permitted by high quality rail bed, this is a plausible hypothesis.
Nevertheless, given the magnitude of this disequilibrium, it is unlikely that it
can be explained by demand effects alone.
Another explanation may be related to the lumpiness of capital and the
need of the railroads to maintain a minimum service level to be competitive with
trucks. Thus the railroads may not be faced with a decision about investing a
30
given amount of ws capital at the margin, but may, in fact, be faced with the
need to maintain a critical amount of capital if they are to maintain an accept-
able service level. This suggests that once this critical level is reached, the
railroads may have an incentive to invest their cash flow in non-rail activities
or in capital restructuring. While there is some evidence of this behavior,38
it does not appear to be pervasive.
Thus we are led back to the conclusion that the institutional barriers to
capital adjustment may substantial. The rate of capital adjustment is extremely
slow, and the transition from the existing inefficient equilibrium to an effi-
cient cost-minimizing is a long one. This, in turn, suggests that it might make
sense to provide railroads with further incentives to rationalize their route
structure. While the rail industry has certainly become more efficient in the
period since the Staggers Act, the evidence of this paper suggests that, at least
with respect to their capital stock, they still have a long way to go.
NOTES
1i. For a discussion of the impact of the Staggers Act upon coal and related
rates see Moore (1983), Rose (1988) and Friedlaender (1991).
2. Because of the apparent high returns to scale associated with rail
operations, there is a potential conflict between the shippers' needs for stable
and equitable rates and the railroads' needs to earn a fair rate of return. This
issue has become particularly important with respect to "captive" shippers of
coal and other non-competitive commodities who argue that the railroads are
charging them excessive and inequitable rates. Although these shippers have
introduced legislation to limit the railroads' ability to charge rates
substantially in excess of variable costs, as of this writing, this legislation
has not left committee. Friedlaender (1991) has recently undertaken an analysis
indicating that the apparent contradiction between rail profitability and
equitable coal rates may not exist.
3. See Caves, et. al. (1985) and Friedlaender and Spady (1981).
4. Meyer and Tye (1985) provide a useful discussion of these transitional
adjustments. In addition, it is important to note that output levels will change
as the rail and related transportation markets adjust to a quasi-regulated envi-
ronment. Thus the adjustments discussed in this paper represent a partial-equi-
librium analysis instead of a full general-equilibrium analysis.
5. The most recent rail cost function was estimated by Caves and his
associates (1985), who used panel data on a sample of Class I railroads for the
period 1951-1975.
6. Fuel expenditures include fuel and other energy and power costs, while.
labor expenditures include direct wage payments plus fringe benefit payments.
Equipment expenditures are calculated as the opportunity cost of capital times
the current year reproduction value of the equipment capital stock. Expenditures
on materials and supplies are defined as a residual after the other expenditures
have been subtracted from variable costs. See Vellturo (1989) for a full
description of these and other variables.
7. Although data are available for tons carried by commodity type, length
of haul is a sufficiently important dimension of output that it was felt that it
should also be incorporated in the measure of output.
8. During our sample period, Amtrak had taken over rail passenger service,
so that none of the carriers in our sample had any passenger traffic.
9. Specifically, the user cost of equipment (Pit) was estimated to be equal
to the effective after-tax cost of equipment debt issued by each railroad i in
year t (rit), plus a measure of after-tax geometric depreciation (a) multiplied
by a price index of rail equipment (Pt). Thus Pit - Pt(rit + 8). As such there
is a railroad specific measure of the price of equipment capital for each year
of the sample.
10. See Wang Chiang and Friedlaender (1985) for an example of the use of
these variables in estimating trucking costs.
11. During our sample period a number of major consolidations took place in
which the Burlington Northern merged with the Colorado Southern, the Fort Worth
Denver and the Saint Louis and San Francisco Railroads; the Chessie and the
Seaboard Systems merged to create the CSX system; the Norfolk and Western and
Southern Railroads merged to form the Norfolk Southern System; the Union
Pacific, Missouri Pacific, and Western Pacific Merged to form the Union Pacific
System, and Conrail was formed out of the merger of the Penn-Central System with
the New Haven, Reading, Central of New Jersey, and Erie Lackawana Railroads. See
Vellturo(1989) for a full discussion of rail merger history during this period
and Berndt et al. (1991) for a discussion of the impact of mergers on productivi-
ty growth.
12. See Mundlak (1978), Caves et. al. (1985) and Vellturo (1989) for a full
discussion of these issues.
13. A large number of railroads lost Class I status, some went bankrupt, and
others had incomplete bond histories (which made it impossible to generate cor-
rect capital equipment costs). See Hausman and Taylor (1981) and Judge et al.
(1985) for a full discussion of the use of unbalanced panel data.
14. Note that this specification assumes that mergers have a one time
positive "adjustment cost" effect on costs as measured by AD4 (the coefficient
on the MDUM variable), but that costs can diminish subsequently over time
depending on the value of the M1 and M1 1 parameters. By permitting the time
counters to interact with input prices we follow the usual practice of
introducing differential productivity effects with respect to inputs but not
with respect to output or capital. The homogeneity restrictions associated with
this equation are:
n n
SAi= 1; ABil = 0
i=1 i=l
n n n
S1AAic = 0 V c; i ACij = 0 Vj;~ ADih = 0 h = r ,m
15. This interpretation of the unobserved variables is more general than that
of Caves et al, (1985), who assume that the fixed effects enter the cost
function, but not the input share equations.
16. The coefficients given in the cost and input share equations should be
interpreted as follows:
Ao - Ao' + Fr r - 1,...,R-1;
Ai - Ai' + Fir, i - 1,...,n; r - 1,...,R-1
where Ao' and Ai' respectively represent the intercept and linear coefficients
on the input price variable for the base railroad (denoted by R); Fr is a zero-
one intercept dummy for railroad r in the cost function, and Fir is both a zero-
one intercept dummy for railroad r in the ith share equation and a multiplicitive
dummy variable on the In wi term in the variable cost function equation.
17. For consistency, we must also impose appropriate adding up conditions on
these fixed effects, which are given as follows:
n-i
Fnr = - Fjr , r = 1,... R-1
j =I1
n-i
Fno = - Fio
i=1
18. We implicitly assume that p is equal across firms. We also assume that
p may differ between the cost function and the factor share equations, but is
equal across factor shares. Hence, we assume a diagonal autocovariance matrix,
with the diagonal elements for the share equation autoregressive parameters being
equal. For further discussion, see Berndt and Savin (1975)
19. To test for endogeneity of output and its components, we implemented a
system version of the Hausman specification test by estimating an equation system
consisting of the variable cost function and n-1 of the cost share equations (we
deleted the linearly dependent M&S cost share equation from this system) under
two alternative procedures: first, by using 3SLS assuming that y, ALOH,%AG, and
%COAL and their transforms are endogenous; and then by maximum likelihood (ML)
under the assumption that all regressors are uncorrelated with the error terms.
Note that under the null hypothesis ML estimation is efficient, while 3SLS is
consistent; if the alternative hypothesis is true, then only the 3SLS estimates
are consistent. The X2 test statistic corresponding to the null hypothesis that
03SLS - PML is 1252.99, which is much larger than the critical value with 38
degrees of freedom at any reasonable significance level. Thus we conclude that
y, ALOH, %COAL, and, %AG are endogenous. All subsequent estimation results that
we report are therefore based on the assumption that these output-related
variables are endogenous and are based on 3SLS with appropriate instrumental
variables.
20. These data were obtained at the state level and were then aggregated for
each railroad according to the states through which each firm operates. Although
such a method does not account for demand effects arising from interline traffic,
any attempt to incorporate interlining would be ad hoc and would reduce the het-
erogeneity of the instruments. See Vellturo (1989) for a full discussion of the
use of these variables and their construction.
21. The estimated p in the cost function was 0.1535 with a t-statistic of
0.1160, while the estimate of the common p in the share equation was 0.1956 with
a t-statistic of 0.1090.
22. Specifically, point estimates of either the montonicity or concavity
conditions were violated at 119 of the 229 observations (52%).
23. The point estimate of the CC1 1 coefficient was 0.6775, with a robust
standard error of 0.3252.
24. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe (ATSF) railroad was treated as the
"base case" railroad. Hence all the fixed effects estimates given in Table 4
should be interpreted as differences from this base case railroad.
25. Whether to estimate the variables as deviations from the grand sample
mean or not is really a matter of computational convenience. Using variables
measured as deviations from the mean permits an interpretation of the first-order
coefficients of the cost function as representing the relevant elasticity or in-
put share at the grand sample mean, but fails to provide a direct estimate of the
fixed effects dummy variables. The approach followed here provides direct esti-
mates of the fixed effects dummy variables, but does not provide an intuitive
interpretation of the coefficients on the linear terms.
26. In view of the large number of parameters generated by the introduction
of fixed effects, an analysis of the specification of the fixed effects was also
performed; specifications were also estimated that employed fixed effects only
on the constant term or that utilized regional fixed effects instead of firm-
specific fixed effects. These implied restrictions were rejected. This implies,
of course, that not only should a full range of firm-specific fixed effects be
included in estimating rail costs using panel data, but the fixed effects should
enter into the input share equations. Intuitively this makes sense, since input
utilization should be closely related to the firm's network; the fixed effects
are envisaged as capturing unobserved network effects.
27. Short run returns to scale are conditional on the existing capital stock,
while long run returns to scale are conditional on the optimal capital stock for
the given level of output. Since output would doubtless change with the capital
stock, these estimates do not provide a measure of returns to scale at the full
equilibrium of the firm.
28. Since ton-miles is the product of tons (T) and average length of haul
(ALOH), which not only enter into the cost function as output but as technologi-
cal variables, the definition of scale economies will differ under different as-
sumptions about changes in output. Within the context of this cost function,
which includes ALOH and the composition of output as technological variables,
economies of density can be thought of as a measure of ray economies of scale
with respect to physical output, holding ALOH fixed. Alternative measures of
economies of scale include letting ALOH adjust proportionately with tonnage and
incorporating the actual changes in the components of output as weights. See
Friedlaender (1991) for a full discussion of these points and estimates of dif-
ferent measures of economies of scale for the railroads in the sample. She con-
cludes that the tonnage related measure of returns to scale is the most reliable.
29. As is true in the output-related measures of returns to scale, we can
consider various size related measures that incorporate different changes in
output (e.g., tons alone, tons with ALOH, etc.). Because we found the ton-re-
lated measure to be the most reliable, we utilize its size-related counterpart.
Caves et al. (1985) provide some alternative measures of size-related economies
that incorporate changes in the various components of output.
30. Alternatively, one can think of miles of track as a fixed input akin to ws
capital and assume that a railroad minimizes costs with respect both these
variables. While this has some intuitive appeal, there are a number of diffi-
culties associated with this approach: (i) during the period of regulation, mile
of track reflected the common carrier obligation of the railroad; (ii) during the
period of deregulation, mile of track was adjusted to reflect service quality and
hence incorporated demand as well as cost characteristics; (iii) if miles of
track are viewed as an input, the resulting production function exhibits a pecu-
liar form of separability since N requires inputs of capital and labor, which in
turn are too independent of N. For these reasons, we follow the usual analysis
of rail costs and treat N as a technological variable reflecting the environment
in which the railroad operates and XF as the fixed factor over which the railroad
optimizes.
31. Using similar definitions, Caves et al. (1985) found returns to scale to
be substantially lower than our estimates (an estimate at mean of 0.98 with a
standard error 0.07). Since their sample period covered 1951-1975, their results
are not directly comparable to ours.
32. Although Conrail was also the result of a merger, it is a special case
since it was publicly operated during this period and received substantial in-
fusions of government funds for its ws capital
33. This can be seen by considering the following model in which demand de-
pends on price (p) and service quality (S), which in turn depends on the amount
of ws capital (K). In this case profits are given by the following expression
n - p . y(p, S(K)) - CV(y, w, K) - pKK
where the other arguments in the demand and cost function have been suppressed
for notational convenience. In this case, it is straightforward to show that the
optimal amount of capital obtains when MRK - aCv/aK + PK. Thus in equilibrium
the difference between the absolute value of opportunity cost of capital and its
shadow price is exactly equal to the marginal revenue of capital. While it is
unlikely that this equilibrium existed during the sample period, this analysis
is suggestive and indicates that the observed difference in the shadow price of
capital and its opportunity cost may overestimate the true extent of the actual
capital disequilibrium.
34. The measures of the aggregate excess capacity for the selected sample
points is given as follows:
1974 $ 8.949 billion
1979 $ 9.384 billion
1984 $16.908 billion
1986 $12.124 billion
Because of problems associated with the first and second order regularity con-
ditions, it was not always possible to obtain estimates of the optimal capital
stock for all railroads for the representative years in the sample. Consequently,
the aggregate measure of excess capacity for these years is not comparable.
35. This is comparable to the estimates of the dead weight loss associated
with inefficient pricing reported in Winston (1988).
36. The aggregate cost differentials for each year used in this analysis were
as follows:
1974 $ 0.557 billion
1979 $ 0.555 billion
1984 $ 1.467 billion
1986 $ 0.630 billion
As indicated above, it is somewhat difficult to compare these figures, since
measures of the optimal costs were not available for all of the railroads at
these sample points. It is interesting to note that these estimates are
comparable to those estimated by Winston et al. (1990).
37. See Vellturo (1989) for a full discussion of this point.
38. For example, in the early 1980's, the CSX diversified into real estate
as well as transportation related investments; Conrail undertook a stock buy back
plan in 1990; and the Southern Pacific bought a major interest of SPRINT.
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